

RULE OF LAW REPORT 2025 SLOVENIJA

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1. CHECKS AND BALANCES

1.1. Legislative process

a) Incidence of expedited and emergency procedures

In 2025, the Slovenian legislative process saw an increasing number of urgent and expedited procedures in the context of the National Assembly's adoption of laws. Despite the importance of the regular legislative process and the fact that urgent and expedited procedures are permitted only in exceptional situations, in practice there has been an increase in both expedited and urgent legislative procedures for some time now. The Research Department of the National Assembly prepared a study of the most recent terms of the National Assembly and the duration of the legislative process, which shows that the proportion of laws adopted through urgent and expedited legislative procedures in the last three terms of the National Assembly together accounted for more than 50% of all adopted laws. The Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly explicitly define the cases in which a proposer may, as an exception, propose that the National Assembly consider a bill under an expedited or urgent procedure. In particular, the instances in which an urgent procedure is permitted are limited; the government, as the proposer, may propose it only in cases explicitly listed, and even then, only if the adoption of the law is necessary for these reasons (national security/defence interests, response to natural disasters, prevention of consequences for the functioning of the state that would be difficult to remedy).

b) Shortening the regular legislative process and its phases

In addition to the above, a problem has arisen in recent years regarding the timeline of the regular legislative process and the shortening of individual phases within that process. As indicated in the report by the National Assembly's Research Department, in 2025 (through the end of July), out of 44 laws adopted through the regular legislative process, the process took less than three months in as many as 28 cases. In addition, regular legislative procedures are carried out more quickly during extraordinary sessions of the National Assembly and urgent sessions of the National Assembly's standing committees. According to a report by the Research Department, during the last two terms of the National Assembly, there was also a high proportion of adopted laws in which the second and third readings of a bill were conducted during the same session, while in some cases the third reading was held during an extraordinary session with the aim of expediting the law's adoption. Such conduct by the legislature undermines the purpose of the regular legislative process and impairs the ability to debate and draft legislation in a thorough and high-quality manner. It also

prevents an in-depth consideration of bills, in part by limiting the public's ability to participate in the legislative process.

1.2. Justice System

The development of the Slovenian judicial system shows very limited progress in certain areas, while at the same time it continues to face structural challenges, particularly with regard to the system's capacity and evidence-based management. Although recent reforms, including a package of judicial legislation¹ and the public sector wage reform, which affects the judiciary, signal renewed momentum in the area of reforms, their impact on efficiency and the reduction of backlogs remains limited. Proceedings remain too lengthy, particularly in civil and commercial cases at the first instance and in administrative disputes, highlighting persistent challenges to the effective functioning of the judicial system.² A key warning sign is the lack of comprehensive, integrated judicial statistics, despite efforts toward digitization. Data on crime, criminal prosecutions, court proceedings, and outcomes remain fragmented across institutions, making it impossible to gain a clear overview of case progress, duration, and the consistency of decision-making. This lack of organized and accessible data significantly limits the ability to identify bottlenecks, assess the proportionality of sanctions, and monitor whether the judicial system is functioning effectively. Without reliable data, there is a risk that structural problems—such as the steadily rising number of pending cases and the disproportionate burden of urgent proceedings related to detention and asylum—will remain inadequately addressed. Furthermore, there are concerns regarding governance and legal certainty, particularly regarding the limited transparency and justification of certain institutional decisions within the judicial system. Stakeholders have emphasized that certain key decisions affecting the judiciary are not systematically explained or made available to the public, which limits understanding of how the judiciary is managed. In the area of criminal justice, experts have also drawn attention to procedural practices, under which complainants who are not officially recognized as victims may receive rejection decisions without a substantive explanation, making it difficult to understand why cases are not being addressed and limiting effective oversight.³

1.3. Judicial Delays

¹ Slovenia maintains stable indicators in the European Union's report on the state of the judiciary. Available at: [Poslanci potrdili zakonodajni sveženj sodniške in tožilske zakonodaje | GOV.SI](#) (17.4.2026).

² Slovenia maintains stable indicators in the European Union's report on the state of the judiciary. Available at: [Slovenija ohranja stabilne kazalnike v poročilu Evropske unije o pregledu stanja pravosodja | GOV.SI](#) (17.4.2026).

³ Peace Institute, Internal Consultations with a Legal Expert from the Non-Governmental Sector on 21.1.2026.

We have witnessed a trend of rising numbers of pending cases over the past few years. The Judicial Council's 2024 report states that the total number of pending cases increased from nearly 121,000 in 2022 to 123,383 in 2023 and 126,531 in 2024. 12 According to the Supreme Court's 2024 report, the high number of cases of detention under Article 308 of the Criminal Code (illegal crossing of the state border or territory) continues to place a disproportionate burden on criminal courts, causing delays in other proceedings.⁴

Legal experts point out that this is a structural problem. The increased use of pretrial detention in cases under Article 308 of the Criminal Code (KZ-1) requires significant judicial, prosecutorial, and police resources that would otherwise be allocated to the prosecution of more serious crimes, and has significantly contributed to court backlogs, prolonged proceedings, prison overcrowding, and increased costs for the judicial system. This dynamic poses a serious risk to the right to a trial within a reasonable time, affecting both defendants and victims in unrelated cases, and raises broader concerns regarding the proportionality and long-term sustainability of current criminal justice policies.⁵

In March 2024, the Judicial Council officially acknowledged that the increase in the number of asylum cases under the International Protection Act had placed a significant burden on the Administrative Court. The Council concluded that the temporary reassignment of asylum cases to judges handling other administrative matters could help resolve urgent proceedings. However, this approach causes disproportionate delays in other administrative disputes. The Council warned that such delays raise serious concerns regarding equality before the law and the right to a trial within a reasonable time, and called for the creation of additional judicial positions in the relevant chamber as a structural solution.⁶

In response, the Administrative Court adopted a program to reduce the backlog for the period 2023–2025, through which it implemented organizational measures and hired additional judicial assistants. Despite these efforts, challenges remain, and the Supreme Court has cautioned against legislative solutions that transfer executive powers to the judiciary, as such arrangements undermine the separation of powers and place an additional burden on administrative courts.⁷ Although the Supreme Court's 2025 report has not yet been published, the available information indicates that asylum cases—due to their constitutional urgency and implications for the protection of fundamental

⁴ Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, Annual Report on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Courts, 2024. Available at: [Microsoft Word - LPUUS 2024 15052025.doc](#). (17.4.2026).

⁵ La. Da., G. C., Prison Staff: Conditions in prisons are unbearable, prisons are overcrowded, and our work is not valued. Available at [Zaposleni v zaporih: Razmere v zaporih so nevzdržne, zapori prepolni, naše delo ni cenjeno - RTV SLO](#) (17.4.2026).

⁶ Judicial Council of the Republic of Slovenia, Annual Report of the Judicial Council of the Republic of Slovenia. Available at: [Letno poročilo 2024 Sodni svet RS.pdf](#) (17.4.2026).

⁷ Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia, Annual Report on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Courts, 2024. Available at: [Microsoft Word - LPUUS 2024 15052025.doc](#). (17.4.2026).

rights—continue to be given priority over other administrative disputes. This practice leads to the systematic postponement of non-urgent cases and raises concerns regarding equal access to legal protection and the right of all parties to a timely decision.⁸

1.4. Legislative Reforms

a) *Act on Emergency Measures to Ensure Public Safety*

In November 2025, the National Assembly passed the Act on Emergency Measures to Ensure Public Safety,[1] commonly known as the Šutar Act. Authorities justified the law by citing a rise in violent crime and the need for a more effective state response to serious security threats; it was passed immediately following the tragic death of Aleš Šutar. The law, which was drafted and adopted in less than a month, introduced an exceptionally broad range of measures aimed at ensuring public safety. Although the law formally applies to the general population, the legislative initiative was widely presented in political and public discourse as a response to security concerns related to specific marginalized communities, particularly the Romani population. This context raises concerns that, despite its formally neutral wording, the law could, in practice, contribute to indirect ethnic targeting and discriminatory effects.

The law expands the duties and powers of the police; it broadens the range of circumstances under which the police may enter a private residence without a court order. It also introduces the possibility of using technical devices in high-security areas and a measure for the automated verification of vehicle license plates in public transit. In addition to the measures that expand the duties and powers of the police, measures in the area of the judiciary and criminal law are particularly problematic, as they significantly interfere with both substantive and procedural criminal law—it amends provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act regarding the exclusion of evidence and the duration of pretrial detention, thereby significantly infringing on the rights of defendants. It also extends the period during which the court must, ex officio, review whether grounds for pretrial detention still exist, while simultaneously providing for the possibility of longer periods of pretrial detention. Particularly problematic, however, are the measures that provide for a departure from the provisions of the Criminal Code. These provisions are controversial both from the perspective of legal certainty, predictability, and the principle of legality in criminal law, as well as from the perspective of the principle of equality, which requires that all persons be treated equally before the law (second paragraph of Article 14 of the Constitution). Particularly problematic are certain measures that provide for a deviation from the provisions of the Criminal Code (KZ-1) for a period of three years. These include a temporary increase in the criminal penalty for the offense of violence and the

⁸ See above.

“reclassification” of certain criminal offenses as misdemeanors. With regard to the temporary reclassification of lesser forms of theft and damage to or destruction of another person’s property as misdemeanors—even though they constitute criminal offenses under current law—it is also worth noting the excessive gradation of fines based on the value of the stolen or damaged property. The Act also restricts access to free legal aid. Among other things, it stipulates that free legal aid in misdemeanor cases shall not be granted to an applicant who, in the three years prior to filing the application, has already received free legal aid in three or more misdemeanor cases.⁹ In addition, it should be noted that it is not possible to prosecute for a hate motive in cases of new misdemeanours under the aforementioned law. Since theft and damage to another person’s property of minor value have been excluded from criminal law by their transfer to misdemeanour law, there is now no legal basis for imposing stricter penalties for these offenses based on a hate motive, which will also cause difficulties in identifying, recording, and addressing hate motives.¹⁰

The law was drafted and adopted through an expedited procedure, with only a limited period of time available for public consultation and parliamentary debate. Implementation of the law began immediately upon its entry into force, including the designation of high-risk security zones by the police. The scope and speed of the legislative process, along with the scope of the measures introduced, sparked public debate and legal scrutiny by the end of 2025, with constitutional and human rights issues remaining unresolved by year’s end. In response, several civil society organizations and initiatives publicly called on members of parliament to reject the law, warning that its rushed adoption, limited public consultation, and far-reaching security measures threaten constitutional guarantees, fundamental rights, and the rule of law.¹¹

Following the passage of the law, the police designated two areas as high-risk security zones, including a section of Metelkova Street in Ljubljana and the Brezje-Žabjak Roma settlement near Novo Mesto.

b) A package of four laws in the field of justice

⁹ Legal Network for the Protection of Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law Under Scrutiny, dated November 10, 2025. Available at: <https://pravna-mreza.si/objave/demokracija-in-pravna-drzava-ponovno-na-preizkusnji/> (17. 4. 2026).

¹⁰ Legal Network for the Protection of Democracy, “Inability to Prosecute Hate Motives in New Misdemeanors,” December 15, 2025. Available at: [Pravna mreža za varstvo demokracije | Nemožnost pregona sovražnega motiva pri novih prekrških - Pravna mreža za varstvo demokracije](#) (17.4.2026).

¹¹ La. Yes. Several nongovernmental organizations and initiatives called on members of parliament to reject Šuštar’s bill, dated November 12, 2026. Available at: [Več nevladnih organizacij in iniciativ poslance pozvalo k zavrnitvi Šuštarjevega zakona - RTV SLO](#) (24.4.2026).

In November 2025, Parliament passed a package of four laws related to the judiciary (the new Judges Act¹² and the new Courts Act¹³ and amendments to the Judicial Council Act¹⁴ and the Public Prosecutor's Office Act¹⁵). At a press conference on October 14, 2025¹⁶ The Judicial Council expressed concern regarding the reform, stating that it could undermine safeguards for judicial independence and raise constitutional issues, as it eliminates and reduces its powers and jeopardizes its independence and autonomy. The controversial changes include restrictions on the Judicial Council's discretionary authority regarding the appointment and assignment of judges, expanded review of its decisions by the Supreme Court, the transfer of certain administrative powers for assigning duties to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, additional requirements to provide justifications to unsuccessful candidates, obligations to explain deviations from the opinions of the Minister of Justice, and changes to the composition of the Disciplinary Court.

c) Act on the Common Foundations of the Public Sector Pay System

In 2024, the Act on the Common Foundations of the Public Sector Pay System was adopted; the Act entered into force in January 2025. The Act introduced a revised pay scale, under which the difference between pay grades is reduced from the current four percent to three percent, and the ratio between the lowest and highest pay grades is set at one to seven. Under the new law, no public-sector employee will earn a salary lower than the minimum wage. The Judicial Council and the Judges' Association have expressed concern that the adopted reforms do not adequately address the long-term erosion of judges' salaries due to inflation and do not ensure the judiciary's full financial autonomy, as their pay remains tied to the general public-sector pay system.¹⁷

d) Law on the Criminal Treatment of Minors

In 2025, the National Assembly proposed an amendment to the Act on the Criminal Treatment of Minors. The proposal prioritizes proceedings involving minors, strengthens judicial specialization, and introduces early individualized assessments to support tailored decision-making. It also provides for enhanced multidisciplinary cooperation through a specialized unit for juvenile affairs

¹² Zakon o sodnikih. Dostopno na: [Zakon o sodnikih \(ZSod\) \(PISRS\)](#) (17.4.2026).

¹³ Zakon o sodiščih. Dostopno na: [Zakon o sodiščih \(ZS-1\) \(PISRS\)](#) (17.4.2026).

¹⁴ Zakon o sodnem svetu. Dostopno na: [Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o sodnem svetu \(ZSSve-A\) \(PISRS\)](#) (17.4.2026).

¹⁵ Zakon o državnem tožilstvu. Dostopno na: [Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o državnem tožilstvu \(ZDT-1F\) \(PISRS\)](#) (17.4.2026).

¹⁶ Press conference of the Judicial Council of the Republic of Slovenia held on October 14, 2025. Available at: [Novinarska konferenca Sodnega sveta RS](#) (17.4.2026).

¹⁷ IUS-INFO, The New ZSod Reforms the Career System for Judges, dated November 28, 2025. Available at: [IUS-INFO - Novi ZSod prenavlja karierni sistem sodnikov](#) (17.4.2026).

within the public institution “House for Children.”¹⁸ In January 2026, Slovenia enacted the Act on the Criminal Treatment of Minors,¹⁹ which established a comprehensive and specialized legal framework governing criminal liability, procedural safeguards, and sanctions applicable to juvenile offenders, and which will take effect in January 2027.

1.5. Failure to Adopt the First National Strategy on Equality of LGBTIQ+ Persons

Although in 2025, LGBTIQ+ civil society organizations were involved in consultations on the national LGBTIQ+ strategy (which is based on the European Commission’s strategy for the equality of LGBTIQ+ people)²⁰, but they were not included in the drafting of other important laws, such as the amendment to the Law on Infertility Treatment and Medically Assisted Reproduction Procedures to include lesbian couples and single women in medically assisted reproduction procedures, based on a 2024 Constitutional Court decision. Furthermore, despite more than a year of preparation, the national strategy for LGBTIQ+ equality was ultimately not adopted; the Ministry of Labor, Family, and Social Affairs cited as the reason that “this is not in the best interest of the public.”

1.6. Restrictions on the Activities of Civil Society

Civil society in Slovenia remains formally open and is supported by a relatively well-developed legal framework. In 2025, the centre-left government did not take an openly hostile stance toward civil society organizations and has declared its commitment to cooperation. In December 2025, the government adopted the Strategy for the Development of Non-Governmental Organizations through 2030 and the Strategy for the Development of Volunteering through 2030,²¹ thereby officially recognizing the importance of the sector and establishing a long-term policy framework to strengthen organizational capacity, sustainability, and cooperation with public authorities.

At the same time, civil society operates in an increasingly polarized political environment. Throughout this term, right-wing opposition actors and their affiliated media outlets have systematically attacked civil society organizations with delegitimizing narratives, particularly those active in the areas of human rights, migration, and LGBTQIA+ rights. Attacks on civil society—

¹⁸ Draft Law on the Treatment of Minors in Criminal Proceedings is under public review. Available at: [Predlog Zakona o obravnavanju mladoletnikov zaradi kaznivih dejanj v javni razpravi | GOV.SI](#) (17. 4. 2026).

¹⁹ Zakon o kazenski obravnavi mladoletnikov (ZKOM). Dostopno na: [Zakon o kazenski obravnavi mladoletnikov \(ZKOM\) \(PISRS\)](#) (17.4.2026).

²⁰ LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020 – 2025 in 2026 – 2030. Available at https://commission.europa.eu/publications/lgbtiq-equality-strategy-2020-2025_en and https://commission.europa.eu/publications/lgbtiq-equality-strategy-2026-2030-0_en (16.4.2026).

²¹ The government has adopted strategies for the development of volunteerism and nongovernmental organizations. Available at: [Vlada sprejela strategiji razvoja prostovoljstva in nevladnih organizacij | GOV.SI](#) (23.4.2026).

particularly online harassment, disparagement, smear campaigns, and disinformation—have steadily increased over the past decade. Human rights and LGBTQIA+ rights organizations have been disproportionately targeted. Neither the state nor civil society currently has effective institutional mechanisms specifically designed to prevent or respond to coordinated attacks, and existing legal remedies for defamation or hate speech remain limited in practice.

Two opposition parties, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and New Slovenia – Christian Democrats (NSi), played a particularly prominent role in portraying civil society organizations as politically biased or illegitimate actors, especially those working in the areas of human rights, migration, and LGBTQ+ rights. In September 2025, the newly elected leader of NSi publicly made misleading claims regarding the funding of civil society organizations. These statements triggered a coordinated response from civil society organizations, including an open letter from the director of CNVOS, who refuted the accusations and clarified the legal framework governing the funding of nongovernmental organizations.²² This incident illustrates the growing normalization of disinformation directed against civil society.

Similarly, in January 2026, Janez Janša, leader of the SDS party and former prime minister, publicly labelled nongovernmental organizations as the “political paramilitary left” and announced that, if he returned to power, he would “turn off the tap” on public funding for nongovernmental organizations.²³ The normalization of this discourse, particularly in the electoral context, contributes to an atmosphere in which civil society is not portrayed as an integral part of democratic pluralism, but rather as a target of political conflict.

In light of all the above, these assessments point to a civic space that is formally protected but structurally fragile. Although the adoption of both strategies in 2025 represents positive political progress, early warning signs remain evident: the normalization of hostile political rhetoric toward civil society organizations, systematic disregard for standards of cooperation, and continued structurally inadequate funding in key areas of advocacy.

2. CIVIC SPACE

2.1. The Right to Assemble

In 2025, the right to peaceful assembly in Slovenia remained formally guaranteed. Nevertheless, practice reveals certain challenges in its implementation, particularly regarding the proportionality

²² An open letter from the director of CNVOS to Jernej Vrtovec, chairman of the Nova Slovenija party. Available at: [O 300 vladnih milijonih za levičarske nevladne organizacije - cnvos.si](https://www.cnvos.si/300-vladnih-milijonih-za-levicarske-nevladne-organizacije) (23.4.2026).

²³ Gašper Stražišar, “NGOs: The Left’s Political Paramilitary Force,” January 13, 2026. Available at: [“Nevladniki, to je politična paravojska levice”](https://www.nevladniki.to/je-politicka-paravojska-levice) (23.4.2026).

of police measures and the potential deterrent effect of punishing protest participants. In specific cases, questions remain regarding the scope of the use of coercive measures and procedural safeguards for participants in peaceful assemblies, which requires further attention from the perspective of compliance with constitutional and legislative standards.

In practice, however, challenges re-emerged in 2025, particularly in the context of protests related to the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community. Events related to Pride parades reveal that, in certain cases, the right to protest is exercised in an environment marked by heightened security risks, hate speech, and the presence of organized opposing groups. Particularly concerning conditions were observed at the Pride parade in Maribor. Although the event proceeded largely peacefully, the organizers drew attention to the broader context of heightened intolerance. In the period leading up to and following the parade, numerous incidents were documented, including hate speech, threats, the destruction of rainbow symbols, and isolated cases of violence against members of the community. During the event itself, a group of far-right counter-protesters was also present, attempting to provoke conflict with those attending the protest. The organizers further drew attention to the normalization of hate speech and the radicalization of some young people, which points to the presence of elements of far-right or anti-democratic movements in the public sphere. These phenomena significantly impact the actual ability to safely exercise the right to assembly.

Similar incidents were also observed at the Pride Parade in Ljubljana. Civil society organizations report a growing number of attacks, threats, and organized forms of hatred, which often escalate precisely during public gatherings. After the parade, organizers drew attention to the spread of hate speech—including rhetoric directed against transgender people—and to the destruction of rainbow flags and other symbols of the community, which further erodes the sense of safety and the right to freedom of expression and assembly.

Another important aspect in this context remains the so-called “chilling effect,” which can stem from past practices of sanctioning protest participants or from protracted legal proceedings.

Although no systematic restrictions were observed in 2025, there is a risk that a combination of legal uncertainty, the expansion of police powers, administrative requirements, and the perceived possibility of sanctions could affect individuals’ willingness to participate in public assemblies. In this context, it is crucial to ensure clear, predictable, and proportionate rules, as well as effective independent oversight of law enforcement agencies’ conduct.

3) CORRUPTION PREVENTION

Slovenia has made progress in strengthening its anti-corruption framework, particularly through the adoption of a new resolution on the prevention of corruption,²⁴ which is the main strategic document in this area, and the accompanying Action Plan for 2025.²⁵ These reforms establish a more structured framework for preventing corruption, with an emphasis on integrity management, internal oversight, and institutional accountability. Despite these improvements in this area, however, integrity rules are still applied unevenly across different categories of public officials, as elected officials are not subject to the same integrity and suitability requirements as other holders of public office.²⁶ One of the key issues that has arisen following the adoption of the resolution and action plan is the question of monitoring, follow-up, and the practical implementation of the newly adopted documents.

In 2025, a new Public Officials Act was adopted,²⁷ This represents an important step toward strengthening the legal framework governing public office and clarifying the rights and obligations of public officials. Its effectiveness in improving integrity and accountability will need to be assessed in practice in the future, particularly in light of the ongoing concerns raised by the European Commission regarding unequal standards of integrity and accountability mechanisms among elected officials, as mentioned above.

It is also concerning that the government is not responding to the recommendations of the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, particularly in areas related to major public infrastructure projects and systemic corruption risks. Failure to heed these recommendations undermines the effectiveness of preventive anti-corruption mechanisms and raises concerns about political accountability and institutional cooperation.²⁸

In the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Slovenia received a lower score than the previous year, and the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption noted that while formal anti-corruption frameworks do exist, their implementation, accountability, and enforcement in practice often remain inadequate.²⁹ Transparency International Slovenia emphasized that the Corruption Perceptions

²⁴ Resolution on the Prevention of Corruption in the Republic of Slovenia (RePKRS-1). Available at: [Resolucija o preprečevanju korupcije v Republiki Sloveniji \(RePKRS-1\) \(PISRS\)](#) (23.4.2026).

²⁵ Commission for the Prevention of Corruption, Action Plan for 2025. Available at: [Akcijski-načrt-2025.pdf](#) (23.4.2026).

²⁶ R. M., "A Clean Record Is a Requirement for the President and Mayors, but Not for Members of Parliament," Svet 24, January 28, 2026. Available at: [Nekaznovanost pogoji za predsednika države in župane, ne pa za poslance - Svet24.si](#) (23. 4. 2026).

²⁷ Law on Public Officials (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 57/25). Available at: [Zakon o funkcionarjih \(ZF\) \(PISRS\)](#) (23.4.2026).

²⁸ STA, KPK: The government does not understand our mission. Government: By sharing our thoughts, we are acting transparently, dated August 29, 2025. Available at: [KPK: Vlada ne razume našega poslanstva. Vlada: Z deljenjem razmislekov delujemo transparentno | 24ur.com](#) (23.4.2026).

²⁹ M. B., "Slovenia's Ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index Has Dropped; It Now Ranks Alongside Botswana and Rwanda," February 10, 2026. Available at: [Na indeksu korupcije Slovenija padla, uvršča se ob bok Bocvani in Ruandi](#) (23.4.2026).

Index (CPI) reflects not only individual cases of corruption, but also the broader functioning of institutions, the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms, and the level of political commitment to transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. According to Transparency International Slovenia, particular concerns remain regarding political integrity, public procurement, appointment procedures, and the effectiveness of criminal prosecution in cases of economic crimes. With a score of 58 points, Slovenia remains below the Western European and European Union average of 64 points.³⁰

4) MEDIA FREEDOM

In 2025 and early 2026, reforms were adopted in the media sector that, taken together, demonstrate a measurable alignment of legislation with EU standards and represent clear progress at the regulatory level. In September 2025, a new Media Act was adopted,³¹ which represents the first comprehensive reform of media legislation in more than two decades. The law strengthens the protection of journalistic sources, introduces clearer safeguards against intrusive surveillance, improves ownership transparency through a new media registry (including information on beneficial owners), and establishes prior review of media concentration based on public interest criteria aligned with the European Charter on Media Freedom. It also introduces clearer rules on the transparency of government advertising and establishes specific state aid schemes for the digital transformation of print media and for the production of exclusively digital media.

In January 2026, Slovenia adopted the Act on Protective Measures Against Strategic Lawsuits to Suppress Public Participation,³² which officially transposed the anti-SLAPP directive and extended protective measures to domestic cases. The law introduces mechanisms for the early dismissal of lawsuits and provisions regarding security for costs, thereby strengthening procedural protections for journalists and other public watchdogs. In the media sector, a new Act on the Slovenian Press Agency (STA) was also adopted in February 2026³³ clearly defines public service obligations and introduces a more structured model for financing net costs. The amendments to the RTV Slovenia Act

³⁰ Transparency International Slovenia, CPI 2025: Slovenia's Ranking Has Deteriorated, dated February 10, 2026. Available at: [CPI 2025: Slovenija poslabšala uvrstitev | TI Slovenia](#) (23.4.2026).

³¹ Media Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 69/25). Available at: <https://pisrs.si/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO8930> (24.4.2026).

³² Zakon o zaščitnih ukrepih zoper strateške tožbe za onemogočanje javnega udejstvovanja (Uradni list RS, št. 10/26). Dostopno na: <https://pisrs.si/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO9106> (24.4.2026).

³³ Zakon o Slovenski tiskovni agenciji Uradni list RS, št. 12/26. Dostopno na: <https://pisrs.si/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO9049> (24.4.2026).

address short-term funding gaps and provide for budgetary support for selected public service obligations.

Despite improvements in the legislative sphere, the main shortcomings relate to the enforcement of legislation and institutional arrangements. Broader structural challenges persist in the media market, including the economic vulnerability of print media, the downsizing of newsrooms, and the absence of a sector-wide collective bargaining agreement that would protect journalists in private media. Although mechanisms for protecting journalists have been strengthened through legislation, they remain underdeveloped at the institutional level. Reporting and legal support depend largely on limited or project-based funding from journalists' associations, while attacks on journalists continue to occur.

In addition to the above, the financial sustainability of the media is emerging as a major threat to media freedom. Problems related to the financial sustainability of professional journalism and high-quality media production have been present for several years, which jeopardizes the democratic functioning of the media. This is particularly evident in the print media, where the continuous downsizing of editorial staff and recurring layoffs point to growing structural economic vulnerability.

5) HUMAN RIGHTS

5.1 Human rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

a) *Legal gender recognition*

Legal recognition of gender in Slovenia is regulated in a manner that contradicts international guidelines and recommendations.³⁴ This is because, in accordance with the Civil Registry Act and the Regulations on the Implementation of the Civil Registry Act, a diagnosis of a mental disorder—which a person must obtain by undergoing medical transition—is required to change the gender marker in the civil registry and on personal documents.³⁵

Furthermore, foreigners and applicants for international protection are barred from accessing the legal gender recognition process.

³⁴ Resolution (2015), "Discrimination against Transgender People in Europe," Council of Europe, Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination. Available at: <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Xref/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=21736&lang=en> (24.4.2026).

³⁵ Article 4 of the Civil Registry Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 11/11—consolidated text, and 67/19) and Article 37 of the Rules on the Implementation of the Civil Registry Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, Nos. 40/05, 69/09, 77/16, 102/20, and 108/22).

b) Human rights of intersex persons

Intersex people are individuals born with sexual characteristics that do not conform to medical or social norms for a female or male body. In Slovenia, as elsewhere, intersex children undergo surgical procedures or other forms of treatment intended to “normalize” the appearance of their genitals, for which surgeons are unable to obtain personal, prior, clear, and informed consent. These procedures constitute a serious violation of human rights to physical and mental integrity, the principle of protecting the best medical interests of the patient—especially a child—respect for autonomy in decision-making regarding treatment, and respect for personality and dignity.

c) Conversion practices

According to the latest survey by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 11 percent of LGBTIQ+ people in Slovenia)³⁶ have experienced at least one form of so-called conversion practices. Conversion practices encompass a variety of methods, including behavioral techniques, psychoanalytic techniques, medical procedures, religious rituals, and others, through which perpetrators seek to alter an individual’s sexual orientation, gender identity, and/or gender expression. The consequences of conversion therapy include suicidal thoughts, physical harm, depression, anxiety, and more. In Slovenia, conversion therapy is not explicitly prohibited.

5.2 Human rights of Roma persons

In 2025, discrimination and social exclusion continued to affect a large portion of the Romani population, particularly in southeastern Slovenia, where many Romani people live in segregated settlements without secure housing and often without basic services (e.g., drinking water, sanitation, and electricity).

5.3 Human rights of the erased persons

Despite numerous calls, 34 years after the unlawful erasure of 25,671 people—long-term residents of Slovenia—from the Republic of Slovenia’s permanent population register, the human rights violations against these individuals have still not been redressed. The erased individuals and their families have still not had their status restored nor gained access to the rights to which they should have been entitled decades ago. Even today, some of the erased individuals and their family members—who have lived in Slovenia continuously since the erasure—still lack any legal status.

³⁶ EU LGBTIQ Survey III, FRA (2024). Available at: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2022/eu-lgbtiq-survey-iii> (24.4.2026).